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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, in a leading treatise on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,
Professor Georgene Vairo wrote that "[flew amendments of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure have generated the controversy and
study occasioned by the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.'1 More re-
cently, Professor Vairo noted that, since the 1983 amendments to Rule
11 were passed, "there have been several major empirical studies pub-
lished, dozens of law review articles written, several books and
monographs published, hundreds of reported opinions filed, and nu-
merous legal and non-legal newspaper and bar association journal ar-
ticles written which explore the reach and impact of Rule 11."2
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAw REVIEW.
* Law Clerk to the Honorable David N. Edelstein, United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York- former Assistant Legal Writing Professor &
Lecturer in Jewish Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. 1996, Colum-
bia University; Ordination 1996, Yeshiva University; J.D. 1994, Fordham Uni-
versity; BA. 1990, Yeshiva University.
1. GEORGENE M. VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREvEN-
riVE MAsuREs § 1.01 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995); see also Neil H. Cogan, The
Inherent Power and Due Process Models in Conflict: Sanctions in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, 42 Sw. L.J. 1011, 1011 (1989) (stating, in 1989, that "[many dozens of arti-
cles, essays, comments, and notes have discussed the issues presented by the
recent enhancements of sanctions under rule 11."); Lawrence C. Marshall et al.,
The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 943 (1992) ("Perhaps more
than any other matter in the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
1983 revisions to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 have spawned a steady
stream of critical reaction and debate.").
2. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FoRDHAm L. REV. 589, 591-92
(1998); see also Marshall et al., supra note 1, at 948 (referring to the "outpouring
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Much of the controversy surrounding Rule 11 has centered on the
requirement that a legal claim must be "warranted by existing law or
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law or the establishment of new law."3 Because the Rule
does not provide a standard for when an argument is to be deemed
"frivolous," courts and scholars alike have engaged in a struggle to
establish a definition for this ambiguous term, an endeavor central to
effective application of Rule 11.4
The aim of this Article is to analyze some of the complex issues
involved in attempting to apply the ambiguous concept of frivolous-
ness in the context of Rule 11 sanctions. Part II of the Article docu-
ments the inconsistency in judicial interpretation and application of
Rule 11 frivolousness. Relying in part on the observations and con-
cerns expressed by scholars, practitioners, and judges themselves who
have lamented the lack of uniformity and the troubling results that
have followed, this Part examines closely some of the problems inher-
ent in the current standards.
After demonstrating the wide range of approaches put forth by
both judges and scholars to the interpretation of Rule 11 frivolous-
ness, the Article continues, in Part III, with a search for a common
language for these discussions. Toward that end, this Part looks to
some of these innovative approaches, with the aim of finding an ap-
proach that may be suitable and useful to the various groups affected
by and interested in the administration of Rule 11.
Specifically, building on an opinion of United States District Court
Judge Jack Weinstein, this Part suggests a method for considering
Rule 11 violations and imposition of sanctions through the use of a
continuum, which will allow and require courts to assign a value of
reasonableness to claims that come before them. Under this frame-
work, if a claim does not reach a certain level of reasonableness, as
determined by the court, it will be subject to sanctions. At the same
time, the court will impose sanctions in proportion to the degree to
which the claim is found to be unreasonable. The Article concludes
with the hope that such an approach will help provide a common lan-
of scholarly writing" about Rule 11); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubenfeld,
Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 399 (1993)
("Rule 11 sanctions have been the subject of an extensive debate by legal practi-
tioners, judges, and academic commentators, especially since 1983, when the
availability of such sanctions was substantially expanded."). For a compilation of
law review articles relating to Rule 11, see VAmo, supra note 1, at app. F.
3. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(b)(2).
4. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 519, 520,
529 (1997) ("We have no... common agreement on what constitutes a 'frivolous
suit.'... Most commentators use the term Trivolous suit' without defining it, as if




guage for further efforts at arriving at a more effective application of
Rule 11.
II. THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY AND PREDICTABILITY
Scholars have documented the lack of uniformity among courts
that have attempted to set a standard for frivolous claims. For exam-
ple, Professor Carl Tobias has observed that "[niumerous courts en-
countered difficulty defining the term, articulating consistent
standards for identifying it, and providing clear guidance to counsel
and litigants."5
Similarly, Professor Charles Yablon laments "the fact that many
lawyers writing about Rule 11 say that the standards for determining
whether a claim is frivolous are vague and uncertain."6 In fact, he
cites empirical studies which "support[ ] the vagueness of the Rule 11
standard... show[ing] widely different sanction rates being applied in
different districts and circuits," 7 including an often cited "study of
judges conducted in the early 1980s, in which it was shown that, on
the same set of facts, 60.3% of the judges would have awarded sanc-
tions and the others would not."8 In short, as Professor Yablon writes,
"claims which appear frivolous and baseless in the eyes of one judge
may seem respectable losers to others."9 Thus, as Professor Stephen
5. Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 196 (1994)
[hereinafter Tobias, The 1993 Revision]. For examples of "ftihe problems of defin-
ing and applying the term 'frivolous,'" see id. at nn.169-182 and accompanying
text.
6. Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on
Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REv. 65, 94 (1996).
7. Id. at 94-95 (citing studies documented in Marshall et al., supra note 1, at 982
and FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RULE 11: FnAL REPORT To THE ADVIsORY Coinsr-
TEE ON Crvi. RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrIED STATES 9
(1991)); see also STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF
THE THID Cmcurr TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF PROCEDURE 11 (1989); San-
ford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24
OScOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1987); Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Dif-
fer, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1467, 1485 (1996) (referring to "[tihe simple inability of
courts to agree on the standard of frivolousness."); Ellen P. Quackenbos, Note,
Rule 11 and Papers Not Warranted by Law, 58 FoRDHANi L. REV. 1085 (1990);
Alan E. Untereiner, Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE
L.J. 901 (1988); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11
Sanctions, 100 HAnv. L. REv. 630 (1987).
8. Yablon, supra note 6, at 94 (citing SAUL M. KAssiN, AN EAnRCAL STUDY OF RuLE
11 SANCTIONS 17 (1985)); cf Meyer, supra note 7, at 1474 ('The splits among the
courts of appeals over how to articulate and apply Rule 11's 'objective standard'
are shown to be inevitable, since the future law that Rule 11 affects is never an
object that stands still.").
9. Yablon, supra note 6, at 94.
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Burbank put it, "Rule 11 fails the historic tests of simplicity and
predictability."'o
According to many scholars, the lack of consistent application of
Rule 11 has yielded a number of unfortunate results. One such result
has been an improper chilling effect on the types of claims brought by
plaintiffs and their attorneys."i Indeed, some scholars point out, this
effect contradicts the declaration of the Federal Rules Advisory Com-
mittee that Rule 11 "is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm
or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories." i 2
In addition, scholars have suggested, the lack of predictability in
application of Rule 11 is particularly troublesome in light of the pow-
erful and "penal consequences"1 3 that are likely to follow the imposi-
tion of sanctions. Such consequences, the result of "a public rebuke by
10. Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex-
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1941 (1989).
11. See, e.g., id. ("The costs of unpredictability... can include over-deterrence.. .
Melissa L. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a
Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HAST1NGS L.J. 383 (1990); Melissa L.
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some 'Chilling" Problems
in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313
(1986); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. Rv. 485
(1988-89) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights Litigation]; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule
11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
As Professor Tobias has noted, however, not all commentators agree that Rule
11 has had a chilling effect. See Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Pro-
posed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IowA L. REav. 1775, 1777 (1992) [hereinafter Tobias,
Civil Rights Plaintiffs] (citing Judicial Conference of the U.S. Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345-48 (1990), as
"suggesting that whether Rule 11 actually has chilled plaintiffs is controversial");
see also William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 Loy. L-A L. REv.
7, 36 (1994) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Entering a New Era] ("It is difficult to evalu-
ate the chilling argument: Is it that lawyers have been deterred from asserting
claims or defenses for which they had no sufficient factual support, or to assert a
legal argument rejected by courts in the jurisdiction and not supported by logic or
analogous authority? Or is it that lawyers are deterred from filing actions
designed to extract nuisance settlements? At what point should society become
concerned that the assertion of legitimate interests is being frustrated?"); Wil-
liam W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1013, 1017 (1988) [here-
inafter Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited] ("Whether th[e] unpredictability [of Rule
11] has chilled advocacy... is less clear .... My own experience has disclosed no
anecdotal evidence of chilling. The question probably can never be resolved other
than on an intuitive level.").
12. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 10, at 1934 n.49 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advi-
sory committee note). Conversely, Professor Burbank has posited that, due to the
lack of uniformity, Rule 11 does not serve as a deterrent because "[f]aith in gen-
eral deterrence must assume an actor who calculates the benefits and costs of
behavior in advance .... Unless he or she understands that the sanction was
tailored to the circumstances of the violation and the sanctioned individual, it
may be no deterrent at all, indeed quite the reverse." Id. at 1943.
13. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 11, at 1017.
[Vol. 78:677
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
the courts,"'14 may include "a loss of standing among colleagues at the
bar and the loss of patronage by clients,"'5 "investigation by state bar
associations, and adverse effects on malpractice insurance cover-
age."' 6 Thus, one scholar reasoned, although "[sluch consequences
may well be appropriate in particular cases,... fairness requires that
those cases be defined with reasonable certainty and predictability."'17
Moreover, professors and practitioners have not been alone in ex-
pressing concern over inconsistency in the application of Rule 11.
Judges themselves have long noted the lack of judicial consistency in
Rule 11 decisions and some of the problems that have followed. For
example, in a 1988 case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit observed that "Rule 11 decisions by courts have not al-
ways been consistent, producing confusion among the bench and bar,
as well as inequitable results."'8 Relying on a national study con-
ducted by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the court listed a
number of "complaints" documenting such confusion and inequity.19
At least one complaint appears to relate directly to the difficulty
courts face in attempting to define the vague standard of frivolous-
ness: "when faced with an identical set of facts, federal judges are in
disagreement as to whether or not a Rule 11 violation has occurred."20
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Pratt, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, was more explicit and direct in his
criticism of what he saw as inconsistent application of Rule 11: "If rule
11 is to fulfill its purpose of deterring frivolous litigation, it is critical
that courts articulate clear, objective standards by which attorneys
can reliably measure their conduct and that we avoid the corrosive
effect of arbitrary, seemingly contradictory applications of the rule."21
Specifically, Judge Pratt found that "identical arguments asserted in
the same district were held in one case not to violate rule 11, but to
14. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 499, 518 (1986).
15. Id.
16. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 11, at 1017.
17. Id.; see also Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 536 (arguing that "mandatory sanctions
unquestionably have a punitive aspect, and are therefore akin to criminal penal-
ties. The magnitude of these penalties dictates that the standards necessary to
comport with Rule 11 must be clearly defined").
It should be noted that not all scholars lament the relative lack of determinacy
in the application of Rule 11. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 7.
18. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988).
19. See id. at 871 n.4.
20. Id. (quoting George Cochran, Recent Developments in Response to Rule 11
Problems, 9 CorneRsToNE 1 (NovJDec. 1987)); see also Golden Eagle Distrib.
Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir. 1986) (warning of an
increase in the "danger of arbitrariness" and the decline in "the probability of
uniform enforcement" of Rule 11 (citing KAssIN, supra note 8, at xi)).
21. International Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 875 F.2d 388, 395 (2d Cir.
1989) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
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'egregious[ly]' violate it in the next," even though "the same body of
appellate and statutory law was available to both courts." 2 2 Thus, he
urged, rather than adding to the confusion surrounding the applica-
tion of Rule 11, courts must instead contribute to the "evolution of
comprehensible and fair standards for applying rule 11."23
Perhaps the bluntest judicial criticism of the courts' inconsistent
application of Rule 11 was issued not in a judicial opinion but in a law
review article. In an influential 1988 piece in the Harvard Law Re-
view, Judge William Schwarzer termed the courts "a veritable Tower
of Babel" in their interpretation and application of Rule 11.24 After
citing a number of different formulations that courts have offered for
Rule 11 standards, Judge Schwarzer allows for the possibility that
"[p]erhaps they are all saying the same thing in different words."25
Nevertheless, he concludes, "[i]n the logic of the law . . . the use of
different words at least raises an inference that a different meaning is
intended."2 6 Moreover, he adds, in practice, courts "have not applied
the rule in the same way," because "what a judge will find to be objec-
tively unreasonable is very much a matter of that judge's subjective
determination."27
Judge Schwarzer's reference to a "Tower of Babel" is an apt one, as
it seems that courts have too often been unable even to operate under
a common language in their interpretation of Rule 11. Indeed, even a
brief survey of some of the standards articulated by the courts in a
number of circuits reveals broad differences in formulation that betray
both a lack of uniformity among courts and a more general lack of a
clearly defined standard for frivolous activity. In 1985, in Eastway
Construction Corp. (1) v. City of New York2S-in many ways a landmark
Rule 11 case-the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit held that Rule 11 has been violated when "it is patently clear that
a claim has absolutely no chance of success." 2 9 Relying in part on
Eastway, the Third Circuit 3 o ruled that "Rule 11 should be applied
only in 'exceptional circumstances'3 1 or where the document 'is pa-
tently unmeritorious or frivolous.'"32 The Ninth Circuit referred to
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 11, at 1015.
25. Id. at 1016.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 254.
30. See Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274 (3d Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 1281 (quoting Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987)).
32. Id. (quoting Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191,
194 (3d Cir. 1988)). The ambiguous nature of such a definition of frivolousness
may be indicated by a minor but potentially significant discrepancy between the
language of the court in Garr, in quoting standards from earlier cases, and the
[Vol. 78:677
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the term "frivolous" as "a shorthand that this court has used to denote
a filing that is both baseless and made without a reasonable and com-
petent inquiry."33 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that "Rule 11 is
intended to deter claims with no factual or legal basis at all."3 4
The standards articulated in these and other cases are problematic
because they differ significantly and substantially from one another.
Moreover, as a close look at the terms used by the courts suggests,
these terms are often too vague to effectively provide the kind of con-
crete guidance necessary for parties to formulate arguments, for lower
courts to adjudicate Rule 11 issues, and even for circuit courts them-
selves to review the decisions of the lower courts.
actual language of the court in one of those cases. The court in Garr stated that
sanctions should be applied "in 'exceptional circumstances' or where the docu-
ment is 'patently unmeritorious or frivolous.'" Id. (emphasis added). It is possi-
ble to read the conjunctive language of Garr as thus setting forth two separate
standards for Rule 11 sanctions, prescribing sanctions either in some generally
exceptional circumstances or when the document is patently unmeritorious or
frivolous.
The more likely reading of Garr would probably suggest that the standard of a
"patently unmeritorious or frivolous" document modifies the same, single stan-
dard of "exceptional circumstances" under which sanctions are applicable. In-
deed, such a reading is supported by the court's actual language in Doering,
which calls for sanctions "only in the 'exceptional circumstances'... where a
claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous." Doering, 857 F.2d at 194
(citations omitted); see also Garr, 22 F.3d at 1282 (Roth, J., dissenting) (quoting
Doering verbatim). Nevertheless, the fact that the same court articulated the
grounds for sanctions through potentially different standards is indicative of
some of the problems posed by such vague language and definitions.
33. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1990).
A look at Townsend in the context of earlier Ninth Circuit opinions demon-
strates that the Ninth Circuit is another example of a single court that, in differ-
ent cases, articulated different formulations of a standard for Rule 11 sanctions.
In 1986, the court stated that "we affirm that Rule 11 sanctions shall be assessed
if the paper filed in district court and signed by an attorney or an unrepresented
party is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation." Zaldivar
v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). In 1987, in Rachel v.
Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1508 (9th Cir. 1987), the court articulated
the same standard. However, in deciding not to impose sanctions, the court used
a different formulation, finding that the complaint was not "so 'baseless' or lack-
ing in plausibility' as to warrant sanctions." Id. (quoting California Architectural
Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir.
1987)).
The different formulations offered by the Ninth Circuit following Townsend is
somewhat ironic in light of the court's insistence in Zaldivar that, even though
"no combination of abstract words may correctly apply to every case," neverthe-
less, "[wie believe an acceptable degree of certainty over a subject matter which is
inherently uncertain will be best achieved by applying [this] test in Rule 11 sanc-
tions cases." Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831.
34. Davis v. Carl, 906 F.2d 533, 538 (11th Cir. 1990).
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The Second Circuit's prescription to examine whether "it is pa-
tently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of success" 3 5 osten-
sibly prescribes a single, cohesive standard for considering Rule 11
frivolousness. Yet, a parsing of the standard reveals several different
components that are each less than clear, both in their own meaning
and in how they interact with one another. As a result, a number of
basic and fundamental questions must first be addressed by judges,
expressly or at least implicitly, in order to arrive at a proper under-
standing, interpretation, and application of the court of appeals' stan-
dard. The phrase "patently clear" connotes a fairly high level of
certainty, but it is not obvious to what degree, if any, a "patently clear"
conclusion differs from a merely "clear" conclusion. Similarly, the
court's language would seem to imply, though not explain in any way,
a difference between a claim's having "no chance of success" and its
having "absolutely no chance of success." Finally, the court's standard
combines these two undefined variables, resulting in an even greater
level of uncertainty in how to apply the standard as a whole.3 6
35. Eastway Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
36. It should be noted that the articulation of a standard, albeit a somewhat vague
one, by the Second Circuit in Eastway, did still present a clarification for the
lower courts in that circuit, which had been applying standards that appear to
differ substantially from each other.
In the year before Eastway was decided, in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York alone, judges articulated a number of dif-
ferent formulations to describe frivolous claims under Rule 11, including. "obvi-
ously groundless actions," United States ex rel. U.S.-Nambia Trade & Cultural
Council, Inc. v. African Fund, 588 F. Supp. 1350, 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); "[cllearly
.. even minimal investigation... by a prudent attorney would have revealed
from the onset that no real factual basis existed to support it," Steinberg v. St.
Regis/Sheraton Hotel, 583 F. Supp. 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); "a frivolous lawsuit,
completely lacking in merit," Dore v. Schultz, 582 F. Supp. 154, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); and "so devoid of basis or so obviously designed for harassment purposes
that it justifies departure under Rule 11, F.R.Civ.P., from the general American
rule that each party should bear his own counsel's fees." Gold v. Blinder, Robin-
son & Co., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 50, 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Moreover, similar to the
circuit court standards cited in the text, district court standards at times not only
differ from each other substantially in formulation; the standards themselves
sometimes suffer from a similar, if not more pronounced, sense of vagueness, con-
sisting of a number of components, which in turn require further definition, both
individually and in conjunction with each other.
Even subsequent to Eastway, however, district courts were unable to rely on a
clear standard for frivolousness. Adding to the ambiguity in the Second Circuit's
standard in Eastway is the second half of the court's formulation, which requires
that "no reasonable argument can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the
law as it stands." Eastway Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243,
254 (2d Cir. 1985). In apparent reaction to the ambiguity in the court's standard,
one court in the Southern District of New York relied on its own modified version
of the standard, concluding that "[tihe Court will therefore impose sanctions only
if it is patently clear that the complaint was filed without reasonable inquiry into
whether it was warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law." International Shipping Co. v. Hy-
[Vol. 78:677
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The Third Circuit's standard, requiring, for Rule 11 sanctions, "ex-
ceptional circumstances" or that the claim be "patently unmeritorious
or frivolous,"3 7 is similarly open to basic questions of interpretation. If
the term "exceptional circumstances" were intended to be read as pro-
viding independent grounds for sanctions, it would prove unworkably
vague. Thus, it is presumably to be read as a component of a broader
standard, together with the requirement that a document must be
"patently unmeritorious or frivolous."38 This second requirement, it-
self consisting of a number of components, raises a number of
questions.
In particular, it is somewhat unsettling that a proper understand-
ing of these components would apparently involve defining and distin-
guishing between "unmeritorious" and "frivolous." After all, it is the
very term "nonfrivolous" in the text of the rule that courts seek to in-
terpret; it seems less than helpful to provide a standard that contains
the same vague term. In addition, similar to the Second Circuit's
standard, this standard implies a comprehensible difference between
a document that is "patently unmeritorious or frivolous" and one that
is merely "unmeritorious or frivolous." Finally, if the term "excep-
tional circumstances" is indeed to be read as the first of two require-
ments, together with "patently unmeritorious or frivolous," it remains
for the interpreter to uncover the precise relationship between these
requirements, in order to determine precisely what each component
contributes to the overall standard.
Perhaps the most striking example of the difficulties involved in
applying abstract terms to define frivolousness under Rule 11 is the
Seventh Circuit case of Szabo Food Service, Inc. v. Canteen Corp.39
Judge Easterbrook, joined by Judge Posner, wrote the Szabo majority
opinion, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions, stating that the plaintiffs
theory was "wacky, sanctionably so."40 In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Cudahy found the majority's "'wackiness' conclusion ... not so blind-
ingly obvious as to bring it reasonably within the ambit of Rule 11."41
Instead, analogizing the claim to a law school examination, Judge
Cudahy "rate[d] it an 'incomplete' rather than a solid 'flunk.'"42 While
Judge Cudahy alluded to the problematic nature of applying a "wacki-
ness" standard to Rule 11 cases, it is not much clearer how to deter-
dra Offshore, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). This version contains
virtually all of the undefined terms present in the Second Circuit's formulation,
but, as a result of the lower court's modification of the standard, it requires even
further interpretation.
37. Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1281 (3d Cir. 1984).
38. See supra note 32.
39. 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987).
40. Id. at 1080.
41. Id. at 1085 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id. (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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mine when a legal conclusion is "blindingly obvious."4 3 Nor are the
terms "incomplete" or "flunk" particularly easy to define or apply in
deciding the frivolous nature of a claim. Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit
candidly conceded, despite its best efforts to articulate a standard for
frivolousness, it was "fully aware that no combination of abstract
words may correctly apply to every case."44
Like the courts they analyze, scholars who have discussed the lack
of consistency in the application of Rule 11 standards have offered nu-
merous and widely varying approaches. Some scholars have looked at
Rule 11 sanctions in the context of a variety of broader legal issues,
such as the scope of judicial discretion, 45 legal indeterminacy,46 and
game theory and the law. 47 Other scholars, in suggesting guidelines
for courts to follow to achieve a more consistent application of Rule 11,
have produced a similarly wide variety of approaches, ranging from
mathematical models4S to general and specific sanction schemes.49
While consistency among legal theorists is neither to be expected nor
particularly desirable, it may be useful to identify a common language
through which scholars who rely on very different frameworks might
find grounds for more fruitful dialogue.
Thus, the next Part of this Essay aims to find a common language
for discussions and application of the concept of a frivolous claim
under Rule 11. Relying on a common theme running through the
work of a number of scholars as well as the opinions of some judges,
this search for a common language also aims to facilitate more effec-
tive judicial recognition and application of some of the insights pro-
vided by these scholars.50
43. See id. (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. See Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (1996) [hereinafter Armour,
Practice Makes Perfect]; Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanc-
tions and the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REv. 493 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion].
46. See Meyer, supra note 7.
47. See Bone, supra note 4; Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming
Adversary Zeal With a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CoNN. L. Rav. 7 (1987).
48. See Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an Adversarial
System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 680-86 (1997); Yablon, supra 6.
49. See Cavanagh, supra note 14; Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to
"Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions
Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067 (1994); Tobias, The 1993 Revision, supra note 5.
50. The relationship between legal scholarship or theory and judicial decisions is a
complex one. The fact that courts have not applied the theories of scholars look-
ing for a more uniform approach to Rule 11 may be, to many, neither surprising
nor even disappointing. As one scholar candidly conceded after offering his own
framework for sanctions, "Are the decisionmakers likely to follow this advice... ?
I'd have to say it looks like a long shot." See Yablon, supra note 6, at 107; cf
Schwarzer, Entering a New Era, supra note 11, at 10-11 (citing theoretical views
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III. THE SEARCH FOR A COMMON LANGUAGE
While the terms "incomplete" or "flunk" may, on their own, lack the
kind of precision that might provide clearer guidance and increase
consistency in the application of Rule 11 sanctions, Judge Cudahy's
analogy to law school examinations is valuable. 51 First, the very com-
parison to examinations helps illustrate the importance of a clear and
comprehensible standard as well as a consistent application by the
courts in Rule 11 cases. After all, fair administration of an examina-
tion requires both that students taking the exam have a clear under-
standing of what is expected of them and that the teacher grading the
exam does so in a uniform fashion, consistent with the course
requirements.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Judge Cudahy elaborates
on the analogy, explaining that, "the submissions of the parties are to
be marked on a scale of 'A' through 'F.' Anything falling on the far
side of'C' merits not only the loss of one's case but loss of one's shirt as
well."5 2 As Judge Cudahy's analogy suggests, claims, like exams, can
be graded on a continuum, which would include, at certain fixed points
along the line, some claims that are particularly meritorious, others
not quite as impressive but nevertheless acceptable, and still others
that do not merit any credit.
Judge Cudahy's observation that claims, like exams, can be plotted
along a continuum is significant, in that it represents a willingness to
examine carefully the dynamics of identifying a frivolous claim. As a
number of scholars have emphasized, whether a claim is in fact to be
deemed frivolous is often a very close decision for courts. Scholars
have documented numerous cases in which courts have applied Rule
regarding purpose of Rule 11, but concluding that "[c]ourts, for the most part, did
not subscribe to such lofty goals and generally adopted a much more modest ra-
tionale geared toward eliminating abusive litigation practices.").
Nevertheless, it would seem that in an area in which so much scholarship has
addressed a common problem that appears to exist so widely, and one that courts
themselves have acknowledged, it would be helpful for courts to aim to resolve
this problem by reference to some of the suggestions offered by scholars.
51. Judge Cudahy may, in principle, disagree with the notion that judging Rule 11 is
similar to grading exams, as he raises this analogy for the purpose of describing
the majority's approach, from which he is dissenting. Nevertheless, while he
faults the majority approach for "effectively transform[ing] Rule 11 from a protec-
tor against frivolous litigation.., into a fomenter of derivative litigation," Szabo
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Judge Cudahy does decide the issue
of Rule 11 sanctions by extending further the analogy to law school examinations.
In any event, at the very least Judge Cudahy's analysis insightfully brings out an
important feature underlying the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit, and
his observation may be applied more generally to the way courts view Rule 11
cases.
52. Id. (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
11 sanctions despite acknowledging that the situation involved a
"close case." 53 The problems that may result from the imposition of
sanctions in these close cases have been noted not only by scholars,
but by the Ninth Circuit, which stated that "when mandatory sanc-
tions ride upon close judicial decisions[, tihe danger of arbitrariness
increases and the probability of uniform enforcement declines."5 4 A
more effective approach to the question of whether a claim is frivolous
might recognize the complexity involved in these decisions. The recog-
nition of a continuum, an approach consistent with those proposed by
some judges and scholars, may demonstrate more clearly some of the
difficulties involved in deciding whether a claim is frivolous, while at
the same time it may help set the framework for a common language
for courts, practitioners, and scholars to more effectively discuss and
understand the concept of frivolousness.
Judge Cudahy was not the first among the judiciary to depict the
potentially frivolous nature of claims as falling along a continuum; nor
was he the strongest proponent of such an approach. Those character-
izations would appear to apply to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, a
judge known for applying innovative ideas to complex areas of law,55
who introduced the notion of a continuum for Rule 11 in the case of
Eastway Construction Corp. I) v. City of New York.56
When the case first came before then Chief Judge Weinstein, he
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment but denied the
defendant's request for attorney's fees, finding that the plaintiffs
claim was not frivolous.57 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the latter part of Judge Weinstein's decision,
finding that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous under the standard that
"where it is patently clear that a claim has absolutely no chance of
success under the existing precedents, and where no reasonable argu-
53. See Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion, supra note 45, at 537-44 & 539
n.188 (discussing the "conundrum of the close case" and citing case law); Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CoR-
u-SL L. REv. 270, 303 & n.203 (1989).
54. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1541 (9th Cir.
1986).
55. See generally A Special Issue Dedicated to Judge Jack B. Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1947 (1997).
56. 637 F. Supp. 558, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). The Eastway "case" actually consists of a
series of court decisions, from 1984 through 1987, including an initial 1984 deci-
sion by Judge Weinstein, a 1985 decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, reversing and remanding the case in part, see Eastway
Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), Judge Wein-
stein's subsequent decision in 1986, and the Second Circuit's 1987 affirmance and
modification of Judge Weinstein's decision; see Eastway Constr. Corp. (H) v. City
of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1987).
57. See Eastway (), 762 F.2d at 248-49.
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ment can be advanced to extend, modify or reverse the law as it
stands, Rule 11 has been violated."58
On remand, Judge Weinstein offered a thoughtful, candid, and ex-
tensive analysis of the concept of frivolousness. His analysis begins
with the observation that "[clourt opinions on attorney's fees speak
easily of cases being either frivolous or nonfrivolous, as if all cases fit
easily into one or the other category."59 Contrary to this assumption,
Judge Weinstein noted, "[r]eality is more complicated.6o Instead,
"[iun the legal world, claims span the entire continuum from over-
whelmingly strong to outrageously weak. Somewhere between these
two points, courts draw a line to separate the nonfrivolous from the
frivolous, the former category providing safe shelter, the latter sub-
jecting attorney and client to sanctions."61 Thus, Judge Weinstein in-
sisted on "frank recognition of the fact that rather than being
adequately described by the frivolous-nonfrivolous dichotomy, cases
really do lie along a continuum. Some are clearly frivolous, some
clearly nonfrivolous, and some are difficult to call."62 He then con-
cluded that, though he was "bound by the Court of Appeals' character-
ization of frivolousness," nevertheless, "we cannot say that Eastway's
antitrust claim was more than marginally frivolous."63
Though he relied in part on the concept of the continuum in setting
the level of sanctions, 64 Judge Weinstein did not elaborate further on
the structure of the continuum or fully explain its use in the determi-
nation of whether a claim is frivolous. In addition, on appeal, while
acknowledging that "Judge Weinstein has thoughtfully considered a
variety of factors," the Second Circuit nevertheless refused to "en-
dors[e] the pertinence of each factor" and increased the amount
awarded by 900%.65 Despite the Second Circuit's refusal to adopt
Judge Weinstein's framework, some courts have cited the notion of a
continuum for Rule 11 cases.66 Still, most courts continue to rely on
58. Id. at 254.




63. Id. at 581.
64. See id. at 584.
65. See Eastway (11) Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
1987).
66. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 197
n.6 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Other mitigating factors which a district court may consider
in the context of Rule 11 include... the degree of frivolousness, recognizing that
cases do lie along a continuum, rather than neatly falling into either the frivolous
or non-frivolous category...." (citing Eastway (H) Constr. Corp. v. City of New
York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1986))); Northern Trust Bank of Calif. v.
PRMCO Ltd., No. C-93-0055-DLJ, 1994 WL 567826, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 1994)
('The decision to Me... was therefore not objectively reasonable... and must be
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the more vague standards articulated by the Second Circuit and
others, and, notwithstanding Judge Weinstein's criticism, courts seem
to continue to classify cases too easily into the categories of frivolous
or nonfrivolous.
The notion of a continuum has likewise gained some prominence in
scholarship. Scholars have discussed various methods, both norma-
tive and descriptive, for analyzing Rule 11 frivolous standards that
have incorporated, implicitly or expressly, the concept of a continuum.
In 1986, Professor Edward Cavanagh suggested that the reasonable-
ness of a legal claim be examined under a "three-zone analysis,"67 rec-
ognizing the existence of: 1) a clearly reasonable zone; 2) a clearly
unreasonable zone; and 3) mid-spectrum conduct, which can be fur-
ther categorized into "presumptive standards," which include: a) pre-
sumptively reasonable; and b) presumptively unreasonable.68 In
offering this framework, Professor Cavanagh argues that "[tihe bright
line presumptions proposed in this Article provide a much needed ele-
ment of certainty to guide attorney conduct, and to help courts in de-
terring frivolous litigation tactics without chilling legitimate
claims."69
found to violate Rule 11. However, on the unreasonable decision continuum from
decisions which are fairly close to reasonable to flat out frivolous decisions, plain-
tiffs decision ... was at the fairly close end rather than the frivolous end.");
Temple v. WISAP USA in Texas, 152 F.R.D. 591, 604 (D. Neb. 1993) ("1 next
examine the degree of Trivolousness' of the offending conduct. As Judge Wein-
stein has observed, Rule 11 cases are not 'adequately described by the frivolous-
nonfrivolous dichotomy'; rather, these cases 'really do lie along a continuum.'"
(citations omitted)); Total Television Entertainment Corp. v. Chestnut Hill Vil-
lage Assocs., 145 F.R.D. 375, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("The courts have suggested a
number of factors that may be considered in determining what the appropriate
sanction should be for a particular Rule 11 violation. These factors include...
the degree of frivolousness involved, recognizing that cases lie along a continuum,
and do not always fall neatly into the frivolous or non-frivolous category.").
Similarly, in a number of other cases, although they did not cite Eastway or
explicitly refer to a continuum, courts did acknowledge varying degrees of frivo-
lousness, basing their Rule 11 decisions in part on a determination of whether a
claim was "extremely frivolous." See, e.g., Becton Dickinson & Co. v. District 65,
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 799 F.2d
57, 59 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey); Jackson v. Refined Sugars, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 322,325 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Walker v. Walker, 854 F. Supp. 1443, 1463 (D. Neb. 1994); Nichols v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 127 F.R.D. 525, 526 (D. Neb. 1989); Booker v. City of Atlanta,
586 F. Supp. 340, 341 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holing show cause order "was designed to
insure that the city was not asserting.., a patently frivolous claim"), affd 827
F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1987); American State Bank v. Pace, 124 F.R.D. 641, 648-49
(D. Neb. 1987); cf Fredrick v. Clark, 587 F. Supp. 789, 794 (W.D. Wis. 1984)
(describing complaint as "utterly frivolous and groundless").
67. Cavanagh, supra note 14, at 543.
68. See id. at 543-46.
69. Id. at 546; cf Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion, supra note 45, at 545
(describing theoretical model of a "zone of possibilities," which "helps define the
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Other scholars have been more explicit in evaluating Rule 11 rea-
sonableness along a continuum. In defending the practical use of the
concept of frivolousness, Mark Stein offers a realistic description of
the act of judging Rule 11 cases.7 0 Rejecting the argument that "the
concept of frivolousness has no meaning, that a judge's decision as to
whether a legal position is frivolous is purely subjective," Stein ex-
plains that "[als applied under Rule 11, the concept of frivolousness
accepts that a legal position is generally not true or false in the same
sense as an assertion of fact."71 Rather, he continues, "the concept of
frivolousness posits a sort of continuum, in which some positions are
more correct and some are less correct. At the far end of the contin-
uum there fall positions that are so incorrect as to be frivolous and
sanctionable."72
grey area of the close cases as those sanction cases where reasonable, knowledge-
able lawyers, as members of the interpretive community, could disagree").
70. See Mark S. Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of Rule 11
Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 393, 398 n.13 (1991).
71. Id. According to Stein, "[i]ntegral to the concept of frivolousness is the belief that
judges and lawyers can perceive that a position is so incorrect as to be frivolous
and sanctionable, just as they can perceive that an assertion of fact is true or
false." Id.
The notion that a legal argument may not be "true" or "false" in the same
sense as a statement of fact or a mathematical proof is a complex one. See, e.g.,
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 549 (1993); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1983); John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45
DUKE L.J. 84 (1995); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). For discussions of this concept in the
context of Rule 11, see Armour, Practice Makes Perfect, supra note 45; Armour,
Rethinking Judicial Discretion, supra note 45; Meyer, supra note 7. For a discus-
sion of the concept more generally and in the context of Jewish law, see Samuel J.
Levine, Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Compar-
isons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGs CoNsT. L.Q. 441, 471-74 & nn.164-80 (1997).
72. See Stein, supra note 70, at 398 n.13; cf Crystal, supra note 48, at 686
("[S]et[ting] a five percent chance of success as the level for distinguishing frivo-
lous from nonfrivolous claims."). Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illasion and Reality in
Regulating Lawyer Performance: Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VIL. L. REv. 575, 605
(1987) ("From the perspective of counseling a client on the prospects of success,
such refined line-drawing suggests that at some point on the continuum (perhaps
at a point below five on a scale of one to a hundred as to prospects of success) a
case would be frivolous and the attorney would be subject to Rule 11 sanctions
.... Such an analysis would call for a sophisticated and detailed Rule 11 evalua-
tion by any federal court making a Rule 11 assessment" (citations omitted)); Wil-
liam G. Swindal, Frivolity in Court: New Rule 11, 13 Lrrn., Summer 1987, at 3,4.
('There is a range of attorney conduct, from heroically exemplary to absolutely
ridiculous or cravenly dishonest. The question is where along this continuum the
lawyer's conduct will lead to sanctions."); Yablon, supra note 6, passim (discuss-
ing probabilities of success for claims in relation to Rule 11); Marc P. Goodman,
Note, A Uniform Methodology for Assessing Rule 11 Sanctions: A Means to Serve
the End of Conserving Public and Private Legal Resources, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
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If, as Judge Weinstein and others have posited, the degree of frivo-
lousness of a particular claim can indeed be plotted along a contin-
uum, perhaps judges would improve the predictability of Rule 11
rulings by relying more explicitly on such a continuum in their deci-
sions. Under this framework, a judge might delineate a threshold of
reasonableness that a claim must meet. The threshold could be ar-
ticulated through a percentage, corresponding to the minimal degree
of success that, in the view of the judge, a claimant should reasonably
expect before bringing a claim. In evaluating a particular claim, the
judge would assign to that claim its own percentage, according to the
reasonable degree of success that could have been expected. If the
claim falls below the judge's threshold, it would be deemed frivolous,
in a violation of Rule 11.73
1855, 1895 (1990) ("A court should recognize that the degree of frivolousness of a
particular paper exists on a continuum.... .").
73. Some scholars have questioned the ability and likelihood of courts and attorneys
evaluating claims on the basis of such a detailed continuum. See, e.g., Bone,
supra note 4, at 568 n.140 ("Parties make choices within the limits of bounded
rationality ... and so they might have trouble figuring out what to do with a
continuum of suits. A natural response would be to reduce the continuum to a
few discrete categories, such as 'strong cases,' 'moderate cases,' 'weak cases' and
'frivolous cases.'"); Grosberg, supra note 72, at 606 (stating that placing a claim
between five and ten, on a continuum ranging from one to one hundred as to
prospects of success, involves "extremely difficult distinctions to make, even for
the best of judges").
However, contrary to these concerns, the continuum approach would, in fact,
both require and enable judges to engage expressly in the kind of nuanced evalu-
ations necessary for effective Rule 11 decisionmaking, rather than allowing them
to rely on vague classifications. Cf DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS As CoUN-
SELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 339 (1991) (stating that, in advising cli-
ents, "[viague terminology is more likely to create misimpressions than inform. If
you tell a client that she has a 'pretty good shot' at winning, she may think that
she has a 90% chance of success. Meanwhile you ... meant that she had a 40%
chance of winning. Hence ... you can enhance client understanding by describ-
ing legal outcomes in percentage terms," and providing such examples as advis-
ing a client that "There's a small chance, about 10%, that if we go to trial you'l
recover punitive damages'" in place of "There's a small chance that if we go to
trial, you'll recover punitive damages,'" or that "Tm 90% certain that the Board
will approve the request for a variance,'" instead of"Tm reasonably certain that
the Board will approve the request for a variance.'"); Jacob Weisberg, Keeping the
Boom From Busting, N.Y. Tams MAGAznqE, July 19, 1998, at 24, 29 (quoting aide
to then Secretary of the Treasury, Robert Rubin, stating, that "[o]ne of the first
times I met with [Rubin], he asked me if a bill would make it through Congress,
and I said, 'Absolutely .... He didn't like that one bit. Now I say the probability
is 60 percent-and we argue about whether it's 59 or 60.").
Moreover, such a method of evaluating claims would not necessarily differ
substantially from the implicit decisions often made by judges, attorneys, and
others. See Crystal, supra note 48, at 681 ("While a contention's probability of
success cannot be determined with mathematical precision, lawyers commonly
make such probabilistic estimates of chances of success in evaluating their cli-
ents' legal positions."); Yablon, supra note 6, at 73 ("On the basis of what she
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Such a framework might address a number of the concerns raised
by the lack of consistency in Rule 11 decisions. The standards for Rule
11 violations will be more comprehensible to parties, articulated
through the use of a percentage, which, unlike the vague term "frivo-
lous," provides more meaningful and specific guidelines. As a result,
Rule 11 will likely not have the same chilling effect as currently de-
scribed by scholars and practitioners. 74 In addition, assigning per-
centages will allow district courts to engage more easily and more
effectively in evaluating a claim in a way that is consistent with the
court's decisions in other cases. Likewise, parties will better under-
stand a court's ruling when it is explained through the more concrete
framework of percentages.
Finally, under this system, circuit courts play a more clearly
designed as well as a more helpful role. Instead of defining frivolous-
ness by articulating vague standards that are difficult to interpret and
apply,75 the court of appeals for a particular circuit can set the thresh-
old percentage for all the courts in that circuit. As the district courts
would be bound by that standard, appellate review would then consist
of reviewing the district court's decision in assigning a specific per-
centage to reflect the reasonable degree of success that the district
court attributed to a particular claim.76
This use of a continuum as a scale for measuring frivolousness is
also consistent with Judge Weinstein's suggestion that the sanctions
imposed in Rule 11 cases correspond, in part, to the degree of frivo-
lousness of a claim. 77 Under Rule 11, if a court finds a claim to be
frivolous, it may impose sanctions, including "an order directing pay-
knows and does not know, the lawyer forms some probabilistic judgment about
the case's likelihood of success. We make such judgments all the time. Will my
train be late? Will my Corporations professor call on me today? Will Clinton be
reelected? We assume that we are competent to make such judgments and plan
our lives in accordance with them.").
74. See supra Part IT. Even under the continuum approach, standards may not be
completely uniform, in either the threshold percentage delineated by different
courts or in how courts evaluate and assign percentages to claims. Indeed, all
legal standards require some interpretation, which by its very nature will differ
among interpreters. Nevertheless, the continuum approach allows for a more
consistent Rule 11 adjudication than current standards. Cf BINDER ET AL., supra
note 73, at 339 n.10 (acknowledging that interpretations of "a 70% chance" may
vary, because "language is inherently ambiguous," and therefore "[ulsing per-
centages can reduce, not eliminate, ambiguity").
75. See supra Part 11.
76. Alternatively, a circuit court might allow individual district courts to set their
own threshold percentages. The circuit court could then review the district
court's evaluation of a particular claim in relation to the district court's
threshold.




ment . . . of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation."7 8
In Eastway (II), Judge Weinstein instructed that "[aittorney fee
awards of the full market value of services rendered should be re-
served for extremely frivolous cases, while more moderate awards
should be given for frivolous filings near the border."79 The benefit of
such an approach, he explained, is that it
harmonizes with the deterrent approach of the Rule [because i]t penalizes
more severely conduct that society seeks more strongly to deter. But it penal-
izes only lightly filings in that zone where the bar's imagination and creativity
assert themselves most strongly, thus helping to insulate attorneys from the
chill of the Rule. 80
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, having first calcu-
lated the maximum allowable fee in the case at $52,912.50,81 Judge
Weinstein then held that "because the pleading was only marginally
frivolous, and for other reasons set forth in this opinion, attorney's
fees in the amount of $1,000 ... are sufficiently punitive."82 In con-
cluding his opinion, Judge Weinstein insisted that "[ciourts must take
care not to use their almost unlimited Rule 11 powers to punish in a
vindictive and excessively harsh manner."83
A number of courts have recognized the effectiveness of Judge
Weinstein's prescription for allocating sanctions in proportion to the
degree of frivolousness of a claim. In Eastway itself, on appeal, the
Second Circuit modified Judge Weinstein's fee award, but acknowl-
edged that "a fee substantially less than the lodestar amount is per-
missible."84 Dissenting from the majority opinion, Judge Pratt faulted
the majority's conclusion for being "no less arbitrary in principle" than
Judge Weinstein's, 85 arguing that "I do not agree that the amount of'a
reasonable attorney's fee' imposed as a sanction under rule 11 should
be measured by the severity of an adversary's misconduct."86
Other courts have been more explicit in adopting Judge Wein-
stein's approach to the allocation of attorney's fees. For example, in
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
79. Eastway (II), 637 F. Supp. at 574.
80. Id. at 574-75.
81. Id. at 577.
82. Id. at 584. At other points in the opinion, Judge Weinstein characterized the
claim in a similar manner, finding that "we cannot say that Eastway's antitrust
claim was more than marginally frivolous," see id. at 581, and that "this court
cannot say that Eastway's due process claim was extremely frivolous." See id. at
582.
83. Id. at 584.
84. See Eastway Constr. Corp. (H) v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.
1987).
85. Id. at 126 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 124 (Pratt, J., dissenting).
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Doering v. Union County Board of Chosen Freeholders,S7 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit cited Judge Weinstein's
reference to the degree of frivolousness as a mitigating factor, which
the court found "relevant ... to the extent of the monetary award."8 8
Similarly, in American State Bank v. Pace,8 9 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Nebraska relied on Judge Weinstein's
approach in concluding that "as the court finds this action not ex-
tremely frivolous or at the most on the borderline of being frivolous,
while the analysis of this factor points to the imposition of sanctions,
those sanctions should be light."90
Indeed, perhaps even more significantly than in the area of identi-
fying frivolous claims, it may be useful for judges to adopt and expand
Judge Weinstein's approach to the allocation of sanctions through the
use of a continuum. In deciding sanctions, because the claim has al-
ready been determined to be frivolous, the only relevant portion of the
continuum to be considered is that segment below the judge's reasona-
bleness threshold. Within that segment, the continuum can be used to
chart, by means of percentages, the degree of frivolousness for a par-
ticular claim, corresponding to the extent to which the judge finds it
unreasonable for a claimant to have expected success for that claim.
The continuum is thus important because, unlike the framework de-
scribed by Judge Cudahy, which groups "[a]nything falling on the far
side of 'C'" in the broad and vague category of a "flunk" or frivolous, 9 '
the continuum allows for distinguishing among frivolous claims, based
on degree of frivolousness.
Such an approach will allow courts to follow Judge Weinstein's pre-
scription to reserve harsh attorney fee awards for claims that are ex-
tremely frivolous, and to allocate more moderate awards for claims
that, although frivolous, are not as far from being seen as reason-
87. 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988).
88. Id. at 197 n.6. Without citing Eastway, but relying on Judge Weinstein's ideas as
presented in Doering, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania noted that:
[t]he courts have suggested a number of factors that may be considered
in determining what the appropriate sanction should be for a particular
Rule 11 violation. These factors include... the degree of frivolousness
involved, recognizing that cases lie along a continuum, and do not al-
ways fall neatly into the frivolous or non-frivolous category.
Total Television Entertainment Corp. v. Chestnut Hill Village Assocs., 145
F.R.D. 375, 385 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Doering, 857 F.2d at 197 n.6).
89. 124 F.R.D. 641 (D. Neb. 1987).
90. Id. at 649 (citing Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558,
574 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)); cf Kunstler v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990) (stat-
ing that when a monetary award is issued the court may consider "the severity of
the violation").
91. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987)(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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able.9 2 Thus, those claims coming close to but still falling short of the
judge's reasonableness threshold will be subject to more moderate
sanctions, corresponding to the judge's view of the percentage of rea-
sonable success for the claim. Claims that are even less reasonable,
falling further from the threshold, would be subject to proportionately
harsher sanctions. 93
Because the continuum acknowledges and accounts for degrees of
frivolousness, through a system that minimizes the amount of sanc-
tions when the claim is closer to the reasonableness threshold, this
approach may also help resolve the problem of close cases.94 If a court
finds a claim to be nearly reasonable but, on balance, frivolous, the
court will likely impose rather minor sanctions.9 5 Similarly, this ap-
92. See Eastway Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
93. In fact, this approach may allow for a formula to help determine the fee award.
Working within the segment of the continuum which falls below the reasonable-
ness threshold, the reasonable degree of success of claims may again be expressed
in terms of a percentage, with the threshold in this case representing 100%, or a
claim that is indeed reasonable, even if marginally so, and thus free of any sanc-
tions, and the claim rated in relation to minimal reasonableness.
If L represents the lodestar amount, T represents the reasonableness thresh-
old, or 100%, and D represents, in terms of a percentage, the claim's reasonable
degree of success, then the calculation of sanctions, or S, may be S = L X (T - D).
Thus, if a claim is near the reasonableness border, rating, for example 90%, of
minimal reasonableness, the sanction will be S = L X (100 - 90)%, or only 10% of
the lodestar amount. In contrast, for an extremely frivolous claim, rating, for
example, 0% of even minimal reasonableness, the sanction will be S = L X (100 -
0)%, or the entire lodestar amount.
Such a formula might also help courts follow the dictates of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, that when "sanctions are 'substantial in
amount' they 'must be quantifiable with some precision' and explained by the
court with appropriate specificity." Smith Intl, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank,
844 F.2d 1193, 1202 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc.,
836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
Of course, it should be noted that, as this formula relates to degree of frivo-
lousness, it addresses only one of the factors courts use in considering the amount
of the fee award, and it must be considered together with and, at times, balanced
against other factors listed by courts. For example, Judge Weinstein discussed
seven different mitigating factors relevant to a determination of the amount of
sanctions. See Eastway (II), 637 F. Supp. at 571-84; see also Kunstler v. Britt,
914 F.2d 505, 522-525 (4th Cir. 1990) (enumerating four factors relevant to deter-
mination of sanctions (citing White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675 (10th
Cir. 1990)).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
95. Thus, courts will be able to engage in a clear, coherent, and confident analysis of
the frivolousness of a claim, without trying to avoid declaring a claim frivolous
due to a reluctance to impose sanctions. Such a result would be in apparent con-
trast to the decision of at least one court, which stated, "though this is an ex-
tremely close case and our initial inclination is to assess costs and sanctions,
defendants' legal theories are not so unreasonable nor the deposition testimony
so devoid of their interpretation as to justify sanctions under Rule 11." Marco
Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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proach may help allay the concerns of those who fear that sanctions
will deter creative claims,9 6 and have thus suggested that sanctions
be imposed only in "the most extreme cases." 9 7 While creative claims
may still face the danger of being declared frivolous, if these claims in
fact present fairly cogent legal arguments, it is likely that the sanc-
tions will be minimal. Indeed, this approach is consistent with the
view of Judge Weinstein, who expressed concern for "helping to insu-
late attorneys from the chill of the Rule" particularly for claims "in
that zone where the bar's imagination and creativity assert them-
selves most strongly," and therefore prescribed that such claims
should be "punished lightly."98
Finally, the continuum approach may be useful in trying to recon-
struct some of the circuit court standards for Rule 11 that seem partic-
ularly vague or uncertain. For example, the Second Circuit's
standard, requiring that a court consider whether "it is patently clear
that a claim has absolutely no chance of success,"99 seemingly refers
to a claim that, in some sense, is very frivolous. However, the court's
It seems that the court did, in fact find the legal theory unreasonable, but not
"so unreasonable" as to warrant substantial sanctions. If the court had allocated
sanctions proportional to the degree of frivolousness, it could have declared the
claim frivolous, as it fell short of the reasonableness threshold, while it could still
have avoided assessing substantial sanctions, instead imposing only the minimal
sanctions appropriate to an "extremely close case."
96. See, e.g., Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, supra note 11.
97. See, e.g., Tobias, The 1993 Revision, supra note 5, at 214 (referring to "a heinous
Rule 11 violation for which the offender expresses no remorse and which causes
an opponent to incur enormous expense").
98. See Eastway Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 574-75
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
Professor Yablon has offered a candid, if provocative, depiction of what he
terms "long shots," cases with a relatively low chance of success. Yablon asks the
reader to:
think about just how ugly a low-probability claim really is. To say that a
case has only a 10% or even 20% chance of succeeding means that going
into the case you know that either the theory of causation is dubious
(like cancer-causing high voltage electrical lines), the witness's credibil-
ity is questionable, the case law does not support your position, or maybe
all of the above. Granted, every now and then a plaintiffs lawyer lucks
out and, with the help of a lenient judge and a sympathetic jury, actually
manages to win one of these cases. But even if the Rule does deter some
such "successful" cases, this is surely no great social loss.
Yablon, supra note 6, at 101. While this description is presumably not fully satis-
factory to those who view close cases as unworthy of sanctions, or even to Yablon
himself, who argues against imposing sanctions on long shots, like Judge Wein-
stein, Yablon seems to acknowledge the existence of some grounds for imposing
at least minimal sanctions even in close cases. Moreover, unlike in Yablon's anal-
ysis, which does not appear to prescribe varying sanctions depending on the rea-
sonableness of a claim, under the continuum approach, the potential success of
close cases can be accounted for in the reduced level of sanctions. See supra note
93.
99. Eastway Constr. Corp. (I) v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985).
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insistence that it be "patently clear," and not merely "clear" that a
claim has "absolutely no chance of success," and not simply "no chance
of success," increases the ambiguous nature of inherently uncertain
terms, presenting difficulties for parties and courts attempting to in-
terpret and apply the standard.100
Nevertheless, looking at claims through a continuum of reasona-
bleness may suggest that the Second Circuit did, in fact, intentionally
rely on these subtle distinctions in formulating the standard. Indeed,
there may be a difference between a claim that has "no chance of suc-
cess" and one that has "absolutely no chance of success," a difference
that is perhaps best illustrated through a continuum that measures
reasonableness. A court may find that a claim has "no chance of suc-
cess" based on a determination that the claim is highly unreasonable.
While such a finding may place the claim near the lower end of the
continuum, the claim may not fall below the Second Circuit's thresh-
old for frivolousness. The Second Circuit's specification that a court
must find it "patently clear" that there is "absolutely no chance of suc-
cess" indicates that, to violate Rule 11, the claim must be found to be
so unreasonable that is falls near the very end of the continuum.' 0
100. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
101. This system of measuring the reasonableness of a claim through a continuum
based on percentages and probability is, I think, somewhat consistent with Pro-
fessor Yablon's discussion of "long shots." See Yablon, supra note 6.
Yablon has described a "standard view" of Rule 11, under which "frivolous
claims are baseless claims that no reasonable lawyer would ever have brought."
Id. at 81. In contrast, Yablon suggests that "most cases now being sanctioned
under the Rule are indeed long shots rather than baseless actions that had no
possibility of success when filed." Id. at 68. He defines long shots as "cases with
small but not negligible chances of success," id. at 81, and makes a "case for long
shots," based in part on his belief in "important societal values inherent in main-
taining a system of courts that is available and open to all sincerely brought
claims for redress, even those with low probabilities of success." Id. at 105. Thus,
he asserts that "[a] more honest and straightforward attack on Rule 11 would
proclaim the right of lawyers to file even cases that are poorly investigated, badly
thought out, and blatantly coercive, so long as they are brought with the good
faith belief they might possibly succeed." Id. In short, according to Yablon, "the
costs and controversy surrounding Rule 11, including the deterrence of long
shots, meritorious and otherwise, far outweigh any putative benefits the Rule
might be providing." Id. at 107. He proposes, instead, a rule prohibiting only
.action brought in bad faith or for improper purposes." Id.
Yablon's theory of long shots, which he terms a "slightly heretical theory," id.
at 81, appears, in fact, to offer a helpful, realistic, and somewhat descriptive de-
piction of the way some scholars, practitioners, and courts view the nature of
claims. Indeed, like the continuum approach, Yablon's theory is premised on the
recognition that claims are generally not properly categorized as simply frivolous
or nonfrivolous; instead there are varying degrees of reasonableness to claims.
Even those claims which have little chance of success are, at times, not baseless,
in the sense of having absolutely no chance of success, but are, using Yablon's
terminology, very long shots. However, unlike Yablon's theory, which calls for
replacing Rule 11 with a rule that would allow all long shots that were brought
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Thus, the Second Circuit's standard might be clearer if a percentage
were used to indicate the court's threshold, in place of the current,
rather ambiguous formulation of the court's standard.102
IV. CONCLUSION
Legal standards, whether crafted by courts, legislatures, or admin-
istrative agencies, often contain vague or ambiguous components that
require further interpretation. Sometimes this vagueness is inten-
tional, for the purpose of allowing courts do develop and refine the
standards over time. The United States Constitution is perhaps the
best example of a legal code that intentionally and successfully articu-
lates broad principles, leaving it to the courts to apply these principles
over time to specific cases.
In contrast, the frivolousness provision of Rule 11 is a legal stan-
dard that, as documented by courts, scholars, and practitioners, has
proved unworkable as a result of its vague and ambiguous nature.
Though many have struggled to produce a more consistent and uni-
form approach to Rule 11 adjudication, these efforts have met with
little success. It is hoped that the continuum approach proposed in
this Article will at least help provide a common language for further
efforts at arriving at a more effective application of Rule 11.
for proper purposes, the continuum approach acknowledges the positive purposes
and effects of Rule 11, but provides for a more nuanced and effective application
of the Rule.
102. Similarly, the continuum approach might help clarify other standards that, as a
result of the use of vague and ambiguous terms, appear to raise difficulties in
interpretation. Like the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit formulated a standard,
requiring "exceptional circumstances" or that the claim be "patently unmeritori-
ous or frivolous," see Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1281 (3d Cir.
1994), that seemed to emphasize that sanctions would be imposed only in in-
stances of a claim that is so unreasonable that it falls very close to end of the
continuum. However, like the standard articulated by the Second Circuit, the
words of the standard formulated by the Third Circuit contain a number of un-
clear terms. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. Again, in place of its
current formulation, it may be possible to help clarify the intention of the Third
Circuit's standard through the use of a continuum, which could more clearly de-
marcate the court's threshold of reasonableness.
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